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Controversial Military Combined Command Plan Examined

902C0035A Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean 19 Oct 89 p 5

[Article by Kim Hyong-pae]

[Text] In the midst of creating a dispute over a plan to establish the Combined Armed Forces Command (headquarters of the National Defense Joint Chiefs of Staff), in other words the 818 Plan, which the Blue House and the Ministry of Defense are in a hurry to finalize with the aim of a next-year start-up, as revealed by HANGYORE SINMUN on 17 October. The Ministry of Defense and the headquarters of each branch of the Armed Forces reacted strongly with generally cautious public comment, while some active Army officers and most active Navy and Air Force officers protested vigorously, believing the plan would obstruct the special character and specialization of each force and weaken military control.

Especially reserve generals and officers in the Navy and the Air Force and retired officers called the promotion of this plan "the most controversial matter since the Armed Forces were established. "It institutionalized political intervention by the military and obstructs the balanced development of each force, and there is a movement to stop the plan from passing in the National Assembly.

They have a negative view of the plan that the government is promoting to combine the Armed Forces Commands because, while it appears to allow quick reaction in the event of war, in reality the military command and control system is relatively shabby. It will result in bringing about military power concentrated in one person, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and ultimately even the Constitution itself cannot help but be threatened.

Such a reorganization of the military reminds those in political circles of the dispute within the government and the ruling party over the reorganization of the political system following last year's general election which resulted in a minority ruling party and majority opposition parties. They are extremely sensitive about whether the reorganization of the military structure is perhaps being promoted as a means to increase the power of the ruling faction in the same way as the political system reorganization.

Those in political circles have pointed out that in ordinary times, whenever the dispute over political reorganization is brought up, the ruling power and related people in the Ministry of Defense say clearly that, "since the military is the last refuge for national security, the sacred mission and role of the military should not be influenced by social disorder and changes in political power."

They insist that "in case the military structure is reorganized as the government plans, a strong Combined Armed Forces Command system cannot be avoided under the present Constitution, which has no option but to select a unicameral system of military command and military government." It is a situation which some believe is vaguely similar to the political system reorganization plan for the government and the ruling party which is a constitutional change of the parliamentary system toward a bicarmeral government system.

In fact, Kim Chong-pil, head of the New Democratic Republican Party met with Yi Sang-hun, defense minister, on 10 October, followed by meetings with Kim Tae-chung, head of the PPD [Party for Peace and Democracy], and Kim Yong-sam, head of the RDP [Reunification Democratic Party], on 12 and 14 October, and it is known that they expressed clearly to Minister Yi their strong dissatisfaction that "this military system is a totally unsuitable, nondemocratic system, military control over the military makes things difficult," and "what is the reason to promote the system at this time, with the two former presidents, Pak Chong-hui and Chon Tu-hwan, who took power by military coup, discredited because of the negative effect of the excessive concentration of military power?"

Such a critical view by the opposition party indicates that the military structure reorganization plan contains political meaning beyond the mere change of tactical application. The analysis of the opposition parties reflects the negative criticism that the 818 Plan is basically tied into the mid-term governing structure of the Democratic Justice Party, which has been in mid-phase since No Tae-u's rise to power, and is like a political system to guarantee and maintain the conservative nature of the Sixth Republic and permit the "TK" [Taegu-Kyongbuk] clique to hold military power indefinitely without any relation to the change in the political system.

The opposition to the military structure reorganization is of course from the Navy and the Air Force who are relatively inferior to the Army.

They criticize that, "despite Minister Yi Sang-hun's answer at the National Assembly on 14 October—'The headquarters of each force has the military governing function and the headquarters of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has the military command function,'—under the Combined Armed Forces Command system, because the headquarters of each force will be performing only military governing assistance (i.e., construction, maintenance, etc.) and some nontactical functions, while 650,000 troops and most of the annual national defense budget of up to 6.5 trillion won will be controlled by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is clear that this military system could degenerate into a one-person military government," and in this case: While a Combined Armed Forces would allow quick reaction in the event of war, far from reducing the military budget, it would obstruct the specialization and cohesion of the Navy and Air Force and hinder their development, and would reduce the minister of defense to a figurehead.

Yi Son-ho, a retired Marine colonel and the vice director of the Korea Current Issue Research Center, predicts that if the Combined Armed Forces Command system, which is nondemocratic and poorly developed with power concentrated excessively in one person, and ground troops predominating with over 87 percent of the total troop strength, is adopted the number of two and three star officers, already twice the ratio of the United States, will increase by a simple order of the Ministry of Defense. He warned that "compared to the administrative structure, which would grow, structure upon structure, the tactical structure would, in relation to it, shrink and become weakened and result in an excessive preponderance of high-ranking positions in the Army."

The critics of the Combined Armed Forces Command system, who are mainly retired generals and colonels, insist that "in spite of the tendency of openness in various social power groups, only the military, in adopting this type of combined power goes backward becoming more undemocratic," and "a military structure reorganization plan directly related to the success of democracy should not be promoted in an antidemocratic way in a secret room in the Blue House and the Ministry of Defense. It should be promoted with a view toward the future, and with the people's trust, through a joint research committee set up at the government level which will gain the support of civilians and military alike."

In the meantime, reserve Navy and Air Force generals secretly met with some opposition party members who once were in the military, including Kim Song-yong of the RDP and Ok Man-ho of the NDRP [New Democratic Republic Party] to stop the plan from passing in the National Assembly.

This is their unchanging opinion—referring to the moment that our military, who celebrates its 41st anniversary this year, finally lost the trust of the people due to the political interference on 16 May, 12 December, and 17 May, etc., by some soldiers with political ambitions—that the military control system should be extensively strengthened, which is the true ideal military structure reorganization, and this should be promoted quickly before the Combined Armed Forces Command plan can be implemented.

Series Analyzes ROK Military Transformation

902C0054A Seoul HANGUK ILBO in Korean
17-22, 26, 27 Oct 89

[Article by Han Ki-pong: "Is the Military Undergoing a Transformation?"]

[17 Oct 89 p 3]

[Text] **Crumbling Sanctuary**

Two delicate air currents within the military crossed each other at the change of command ceremony for the outgoing and incoming army chiefs of staff held at the Army Headquarters drill ground on 1 June of last year. The "resentment" of the outgoing general and the "determination" of the incoming general graphically highlighted the position of the military seeking to change "half voluntarily and half under pressure" under the irreversible trends of the times.

The outgoing army chief of staff, Gen Pak Hui-to declared: "There is an attempt to vilify the military and sow the seeds of discord in it by indiscriminately applying the general social standard of value judgement to the military, looking away from the purpose of existence of the military and its organizational peculiarities, under the pretext of achieving democratization and an open society.... Watching the helmet and combat boots, the symbol of soldiery, being mocked at a campaign stump, I could not suppress my indignation, no matter how hard I tried to concede. I hope that the military will not face the tragedy of having to worry about the safety of the state due to internal trouble, and not aggression from the outside."

On the other hand, the outgoing army chief of staff, Gen Yi Chong-ku said: "Under whatever circumstances, we, the military, should maintain an unshakable will to respect the procedures and processes agreed upon by the people in the course of adopting important state policies and back up democratization efforts so that mature democracy may strike its roots.... In order to adorn this exciting and splendid chapter of history, we should establish the intrinsic position and image of the military so that it may become an object of horror and fear for the enemy, a symbol of trust and devotion for the people, and the protagonist of reunification and prosperity for the state."

Ruminating on the significance of that day, one general said, "it was the day presaging the advent of a new order in the military."

One and a half years have passed since the inauguration of the Sixth Republic. The winds of democratization and liberalization have swept the military also. The military is now being accepted as a constituent group of the society, rather than being regarded as a real power in control of politics. Flexibility is permeating the way of thinking of the soldiers who used to adhere to authoritarianism and conservatism.

A general in the Defense Ministry noted the greatest change in the military in these words: "They have ceased to think that they are the only ones who can save the country. In the past the military was accustomed to look outward from the inside, judging things by the yardstick of the military. But with the multiplicity of social and political life, they have now come to know how to look inward from the outside and examine its own existence and occasionally indulge in self-reflection."

In a nutshell, the change in the military is being brought about in the form of change in the thinking of the military, which now believes that "the military can no

longer remain sacred," and this change jibes with the thought of the people that "the military can no longer be left untouched."

On 16 December last year, Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun visited the press room in a corner of the first floor of the ministry building and asked reporters what difficulties they had in covering the ministry. This happening became the talk of ministry officials. This would not attract attention in other ministries. But for those who know the military well, it was regarded as an event, and since then generals have visited the press room more frequently.

To say that the sanctuary is crumbling is to say that the military is doing away with authoritarianism. Last year, in response to the criticism that through a monopoly of information on North Korea, the military is using security issues as a means of preserving its political power, the Defense Ministry invited the presidents of the opposition parties for the first time to brief them on North Korea.

On 28 March, daily newspapers gave prominence in their first pages to reports on the sweeping reshuffle of the army hierarchy. These reports, even accompanied by commentaries, would ordinarily be regarded as coming in conflict with the Military Secrets Protection Law and the mere fact that such reports were made would have been unthinkable in the past. Officials in some quarters of the military, including the military investigatory authorities, were upset by the media coverage, and there was even a move to make an issue out of it. But the top leaders of the Defense Ministry "boldly" condoned the reports, saying that kind of thing could happen once in a while. During the National Assembly inspection into government operations, the waste in the defense budget became an issue. The public received with a "fresh shock" the idea that the execution of the defense budget, which accounts for 32.4 percent of the total government budget and 4.5 percent of the GNP (in 1989), should no longer be wrapped in the veil of secrecy.

Commenting on this, an interested Defense Ministry official said: "The military is definitely in a defensive position. There is no longer any place to hide, and the harder it tries to hide, the greater its side effects will become."

Nothing shows more realistically the fact that the military has ceased to be sacred in our society than that the military appears in TV comedy programs, providing a material to be laughed at on the screen. When a comedy was presented on TV under the title "Cease Action," some soldiers showed a quick reaction and even met with the program director in charge. In those days the military was under fierce attack for the "Samchong education" [a draconian reeducation program for gangsters] and the Kwangju incident, and military leaders expressed their displeasure by saying, "the show may have an ulterior motive of ridiculing the military by showing premodern barracks life."

Commenting on the frequent use of the military as materials not only for comedies but also for dramas and novels, one concerned military officer made this positive reaction: "Democratization is something realistic. In the final analysis, a durable link is formed in the civilian-military relationship by opening the military to the public as it is."

Change is accompanied by pain. When the military came under attack at the National Assembly hearings and in TV documentaries last year in connection with the issues relating to its past political involvements, such as the Kwangju incident and the Samchong education program, the military issued a series of statements and sued National Assembly members to back up its refutation. This illustrates the instinct of self-protection on the part of the military and gives the impression that in those days persecution mentality—the feeling that the military could not yield any more—was at its height within the military.

The terrorism committed in August of last year against O Hong-kun, chief of the city desk at CHUNGANG KYONGJE, may be said to be an eruption of such persecution mentality in a distorted form.

The military is trying to shed its image of being sacred, but it is none other than the military that still stays comfortably in the safest of all sanctuaries. A considerable force within the military rejects change. It may be said that the long-lasting inertia of the military which has been unfamiliar with civilian control, as well as the instinct to protect the vested interests, is responsible for this rejection mentality.

There are many outer crusts of sacredness which the military needs to shed, such as the Military Secrecy Law and ordinance controlling reportage on defense affairs. This law and ordinance bar media coverage on the operation of the defense budget, irregularities and accidents in the military, ban civilians from approaching the military, and permit military investigators to conduct an investigation of civilians.

But the phase which requires a more speedy liquidation than all other phases is the negative mindset still lurking in the military, such as authoritarianism, elitism, and the consciousness of being a privileged class. We cannot not deny the impression that the flexible thinking on the part of the military leadership has not yet spread to front-line commanders and units at the base level. It is feared that if the military should persists in maintaining a scornful attitude toward change, it would become the most backward group among all other segments of the society in the future, although the military has been recognized since liberation as the most modernized and specialized group. The work of the military to shed its sacred status should not be accomplished by outside factors, and the efforts of the military to achieve a metamorphosis should be pushed from within.

This is because the people expect a faster metamorphosis of the military, although they understand that the special

group called the military is bound to fall behind in the process of social and political change due to its conservative and exclusionary characteristics.

[18 Oct 89 p 3]

[Text] **Political Neutrality**

On the issue of the political neutrality of the military, two military leaders gave their respective views to the press in December of last year. These considerably strong views were later called the "doctrine of a 3-day rule" and the "doctrine of a beast-driven mill respectively."

To the group of reporters who visited him immediately after the 5 December cabinet reshuffle, newly appointed Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun made it clear that "any military intervention in politics is an anachronistic idea." In his first statement as defense minister, he said: "Even if the military intervenes, its rule won't last for 3 days. There is not a single general who is thinking of intervening in politics. It is clear that even if such an attempt were to be made, it would only court miserable consequences."

At a year-end press conference on 16 December, as if he was backing up the statement of Defense Minister Yi, Army Chief of Staff Yi Chong-ku, stressed the need for political noninterference on the part of the military, saying that "even if there is a political confusion in the new year, the military will dash onward only looking forward, never looking aside, like the cow working the millstone or the racing horse."

This statement of the civilian defense minister, Yi Sang-hun, was a strong expression of his belief that there can never be a political intervention by the military, and the statement of Chief of Staff Yi "endorses" the credibility of that belief as the highest commander of the combat troops.

One of the most prominent issues which have come to the fore since the inauguration of the Sixth Republic is that of military neutrality.

The atmosphere in which the military came under fierce attack as if it had been the source of all wrongs was such that according to then Defense Minister O Chae-pok, although he exaggerated somewhat, soldiers of the ranger-commando force even hesitated to be out on the street with their berets on and wearing their uniforms.

Opposition assemblymen demanded measures to institutionally guarantee the political neutrality of the military, and even the opinion was aired that servicemen should shout a slogan calling for political neutrality during their daily musters.

The successive statements by military leaders assuring the neutrality of the military stem from this atmosphere, and President No Tae-u in September of last year expressed his intention to study the question of issuing a declaration of political neutrality on the part of the military, stating that "there has been no fear of any military intervention in politics since the Olympiad."

Nevertheless suspicions as to a possible military intervention in politics are deeply rooted in our society. There is yet no one who can confidently answer the question, "Will the military keep its hands off politics?" nor is there any ground for believing that the military will do so.

There can be a controversy over what the political neutrality of the military will be like in conception and form. Generally speaking, it is the opinion of scholars that political neutrality means that the military will be absorbed in the execution of state policies, not getting directly involved in the process of policymaking of the state (including elections). But the crux of the issue of the political neutrality of the military lies in this paradox, namely, that although the military is a group possessing the most powerful physical coercive force, it should never have the prerogative of supreme command in state affairs.

Until now the military has taken various visible measures to achieve its political neutrality, but the appraisal of these efforts varies.

First, the military says it has reduced the political influence of the military through a reduction of the functions and structure of the Defense Security Command (DSC). Of its six offices and five suboffices, the DSC has eliminated the Office of Information, which was in charge of the collection of information on the activities of civilians, with its members visiting even local government offices at the township and village levels to collect information. The operation of this office has had many side effects. As a result of the elimination of this office, 116 small contingents have been withdrawn, and the DSC plans to reduce its personnel by 860, or 14 percent of its current force level.

In addition, since last April the screening of the security status of personnel of administrative agencies has been drastically eased.

A DSC official said that "of course, there has been not a single special presidential order, and surveillance on politicians has long been transferred to another agency." Regarding the change in the image of the DSC, the same official said that "there are practically no requests for DSC intervention coming in from the outside."

During his inaugural ceremony last December, DSC Commander Cho Nam-pung (lieutenant general, the 18th graduating class of the Military Academy) reportedly received applause when he said, "Each and every one of us is an accomplice." According to reports, he meant to tell his men to take joint responsibility for any mistake, while working with a new determination, without calling themselves to account for their past.

However, despite these visible changes, officers who know the DSC well are of the opinion that "the DSC still

remains the most exclusionary organization among the military, and there is much internal strife going on."

The critical view on the DSC was apparent from the voices scoring its investigation of civilians when an issue was made out of the claim by Kim Chong-hang, a Kungmin University student, that he had been kidnapped and tortured by a DSC member.

The reshuffle of the military hierarchy in late March, the most sweeping one since the inauguration of the Sixth Republic, was interpreted as a personnel action taken to eliminate the political colors from the military because its key feature was the transfer of Education Commander Choe Pyong-uk (lieutenant general, the 16th graduating class of the Military Academy) to the reserve; the reassignment of Kim Chin-yong, the commander of the Capital Defense Command, (lieutenant general, the 17th graduating class of the Military Academy); and a wholesale promotion of field officers. In addition, in the course of selection, the defense minister and the army chief of staff met as many as six times, and the president separately summoned the defense minister, the army chief of staff, and deputy chiefs of staff to his office to confirm their wishes. The reshuffle has a greater significance in that it caused no grumbles among the military and that the supreme military commander accepted the reshuffle plan as it was.

Complaining about the practice in the town of classifying particular officers as belonging to particular political alignments, a general asked, "How in the world can you assert that such and such soldiers come under the category of the Fifth Republic or Sixth Republic connection, or the Chon or No Tae-u line?" He declared that "basically, the military is a group loyal to the incumbent president." In this connection, Chief of Staff Gen Yi Chong-ku once said that "I am a person having connections with the Second through Sixth Republic." In April of last year Gen Kim Chin-yong apologetically said in protest against the outsiders' view of him, that "I am a man of the rational justice faction," adding "I myself, too, am a person who cries for the political neutrality of the military."

Early last year the Defense Ministry set up what is called the "Political Neutrality Study Committee" headed by the vice defense minister.

This body devised by the Defense Ministry when it was in a defensive position in those days is a temporary measure in the nature of a last-ditch measure to ward off the intense outside wind.

Saying that "I objected to establishing this body at that time," a general asked, "In what way can you study political neutrality?" A colonel also commented, "All that they accomplished was some political effects produced by advocating political neutrality."

Another factor obstructing the political neutrality of the military is said to be the feud between Military Academy graduates and non-Military Academy graduates, as well as regional favoritism, still prevalent in the military.

The political neutrality of the military, because of the obscurity of its definition, seems to have been stressed only as a slogan.

At a seminar on ways to develop the civilian-military ties sponsored last April by the Korean Defense Research Institute, the "neoprofessionalism" of the ROK Armed Forces, which includes even public security in military functions, came under bitter attack by civilian professors, and the possibility of the recurrence of a coup d'etat was the focus of the discussion. The seminar drew no conclusion, but all agreed to the proposition that the coordinates where the ROK Army should position itself should be those of the people's army based on the consciousness of being an expert professional army.

[19 Oct 89 p 3]

[Text] **Era of Professional Soldiers**

No group exists as an entity completely detached from society. To say that the military seeks neutrality is not to say that it seeks a state in which the military is completely isolated from political, economic, and all other aspects of society.

In other words, only when the military as a social organization continuously maintains its links with society, its parent body, and attains its own specialized professionalism, will it stand on a truly neutral ground and exist and develop together with society.

That there is need to usher in the era of a specialized professional army was a rough consensus formed among civilian experts as well as among military scholars since studies on the question of what place and image the military should have in society have become relatively active following the inauguration of the Sixth Republic.

Professional soldiers are public servants in their own right and they are members of society. A general in the Defense Ministry said, "Soldiers feed on honor and morale, but how do you expect them to keep their honor and morale on an empty stomach?"

What the majority of soldiers want is not military intervention in politics but a guarantee of professionalism which will enable them to devote themselves to national defense, their intrinsic duty.

Needless to say, in the past there were many cases of military men taking civilian posts in all political and social fields through irregular channels. However, these privileged appointments were exceptions far detached from the majority of professional soldiers.

The turf on which the soldiers stand shrank as the oblique view the people had of the military in their minds came to the open following the inauguration of the Sixth Republic. In some cases, officers who were

placed on the reserve list irrespective of their individual capabilities had difficulty in finding jobs simply because they were ex-soldiers.

Because of the peculiar provisions of the military personnel law, most of professional soldiers are transferred to the reserve in their late forties and early fifties, when they are at the peak of their efficiency.

According to military data, soldiers are retired 10 to 15 years earlier than ordinary civil servants, policemen, and teachers; and 63 percent of field-grade officers and 33 percent of noncommissioned officers are retired for either of the three reasons—age, rank, and the length of service.

But the rate of those who have found jobs among these retirees since 1980 is only 16.6 percent (an average of 12 percent in the case of the Army—18 percent for field officers, 38 percent for captains, and 0.7 percent for enlisted men). Most of theme were hired as emergency planning officers, Army civilians, and commanding officers of reserve units. In the case of professional soldiers, only 19 percent own homes, markedly lower than the 55 percent for ordinary public servants. The reason for this low rate is that under the principle of serving alternately between the front and the rear, soldiers frequently move from place to place, as many as 15 times on an average in the case of full colonels, and they incur an additional 30 percent in their cost of living because they have to keep two households for the schooling of their children.

In the case of a colonel with 25 years of military service, he receives a total of 1.2 million won, including 600,000 won in regular salary, 200,000 won in housing, and transportation and professional allowances, but he lives in an 18-pyong apartment with his 5 family dependents.

This officer said, "One of my Military Academy classmates who was transferred to the reserve as a lieutenant colonel had his whole retirement money swindled by a broker, and he is now eking out his living by hauling briquets by pushcart." He added that "those who run a taxi are rather fortunate, and quite a few have been employed as taxi drivers."

The new military personnel law passed this year by the National Assembly is an epoch-making measure to insure the professionalism for servicemen. The main features of this law are the provisions on extending the retirement ages for colonels and generals 2 to 4 years, abolishing, beginning in 1995, the system of forcing field officers who remain in the same rank for a certain period of time without promotion to the higher ranks to retire involuntarily, and on extending the promotion intervals 3 to 4 years. These changes are aimed at institutionally guaranteeing fairness in competition for promotion.

The revision of the military personnel law had long been a pending problem for the military, but its solution was delayed due to the budget. Some Military Academy graduates were against the revision.

The old personnel law played a positive role in turning our Army into an elite army. But the law had the side effect of aggravating the internal antagonism among soldiers with different regional as well as educational backgrounds (for instance, among Military Academy graduates, graduates of the old 3-year academy system, ROTC graduates, and graduates of the military cadet training course) because it failed to insure fairness in providing promotion opportunities and providing a chance for reselection once one passed up the chance for promotion.

In addition to revising the military personnel law, the military has exerted efforts to do away with its old ways and to enliven its expertise and professionalism by taking various measures this year, such as the abolition of the so-called Yusin junior grade system (providing special privileges to Military Academy graduates in hiring), opening the door to women soldiers, adopting a system of giving promotions to reserve officers, stepping up vocational information and training, appointing reserve transferees to military research committees, and expanding service men's mutual-aid associations.

True, the military is taking these rational self-salvation measures. But it is pointed out that there still persists in the military an inclination to preserve its existing privileges. Early this year the Defense MInistry was discussing a plan to impose a waiting period on retired generals seeking a government job after retirement, but the plan was shelved because of a strong objection. In addition, recently ministries and agencies concerned tried to push a plan to lower by two grades the protocol ranking system for officers, originally adopted by the prime minister's July 1980 directive after 17 May [of 1980, the day the Kwangju revolt was crushed], on the ground that it was unrealistic. But the move came to nothing due to strong opposition on the part of the military. According to this courtesy ranking system, which was said to have been adopted in order to boost the morale of the servicemen, a brigadier general will be equivalent to Grade 1, a colonel Grade 2, a lieutenant colonel Grade 3, a major Grade 4, and a captain Grade 5. The rank of captain can be reached in 4 years in the shortest time after one becomes a commissioned officer, and under the courtesy ranking system, a captain is treated as a Grade-5 official.

There is much room for discussion on this issue in view of the fact that in reality, a colonel in the Defense Ministry is assigned to the post of a section chief (a position equivalent to a Grade-4 civilian post).

Inasmuch as the military is an organization based on ranks, personnel problems are at the heart of military administration. It is a fact that personnel administration in the military was influenced by the outside political winds of the military rule which lasted for over 20 years.

Particularly, the inordinate weight given to the educational and regional backgrounds have been noted each

time the National Assembly inspected the personnel administration of the military.

According to the materials on the National Assembly inspection last year, of 130 major generals in the three branches of the armed services, those from the Kyongsang Provinces were at the top with 60, whereas the Cholla Provinces accounted for 16; and of 327 army general officers, the Military Academy accounted for 261 (80 percent), the cadet training course accounting for 51.

Regarding these statistics, the military asserts that an allocation of promotions by groups is out of the question and the principle governing personnel appointment should be based on the individual ability through and through, explaining that Military Academy graduates are undeniably a superb personnel reservoir.

In the number of personnel actions taken since the inauguration of the Sixth Republic to give promotion to general officers, this practice of giving preponderant weight to the educational backgrounds has not changed much. A colonel who is not a Military Academy graduate said, "In reality, there is not much difference in ability among eligible candidates for promotion to the rank of general officer, and the only question is whether one has pull with influential seniors." The "inflation of general officers" in the ROK Armed Forces may have been caused by the bias in the past practice of personnel appointment. In the case of the United States, the ratio of the fixed number of general officers to all officers is 3.4 percent, whereas in the case of our country, the fixed number of general officers is 433, or 6.2 percent of all officers, nearly twice as high as in the United States.

The specialization of the military has a close bearing on the hiring of civilians for military administrative posts. The June findings of a study by the Administration Reform Committee noted that the functions of the Defense Ministry require continuity and expertise in administration as well as administrative neutrality for all military units, but a large number of officers are appointed to responsible positions under a rotation system, rendering it difficult to achieve administrative efficiency.

Active duty officers hold 14 (77.7 percent) of the 18 posts equivalent to the rank of bureau chief (major general) and 23 (44.2 percent) of the 52 posts equivalent to the rank of section chief (colonel). This strikingly contrasts with the United States, where civilian officials hold a predominant place in the Pentagon in numerical and qualitative terms.

For politicians to refrain from using the military for political gains is an important requirement for the neutrality of the military. But it is also desirable that civilian experts will be in charge of military policies and military administration, leaving the combat command of military units to specialized professional soldiers, and this exactly is in accord with the principle of civilian control.

[20 Oct 89 p 3]

[Text] **Thoughts of Generals**

Currently, a meeting of "stars" is under way at the Military Academy. This meeting, called a "mugunghwa hoeui" [rose of Sharon meeting] which is not well known to the public, is an annual gathering of retired general officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This year's meeting is the 14th.

This year more than 425 generals are divided into 6 groups irrespective of service and rank, each group meeting for 6 hours a day, mostly holding discussions. They stay 2 nights and 3 days for the meeting.

The purpose of the mugunghwa-hoeui is to promote the development of military strategies and defense policies by pooling the wisdom of all general officers and to promote friendly ties among the services and among generals. The first meeting was held in 1973 after the ROK Armed Forces drew up their own defense plans. The annual meeting is usually held either at the Military Academy or at Chinhae Staff College.

Despite such a genuine purpose, it is undeniable that these meetings have drawn attention because of their political significance.

This is because the fact that a "corps of generals" meet cannot be passed over lightly, in view of the political influence that generals in active service have had in our political history.

There has been some changes in this year's meeting. First, because the timing of the meeting coincided with the president's visit to the United States, and considering the political attention, the organizers wanted to cancel the meeting. However, by the decision of Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun, the meeting was called into session. Second, compared with previous meetings, the duration of the current meeting is shorter. Except for an overnight joint stay on the last day, participants will go back to their hotels after the meetings. One reason for this is said to prevent fears that the meeting might tend to create factions.

One participant said, "the main content of the current meeting has been the discussion of Plan 818, a military structural reorganization plan, and special lectures on economics, with political issues completely excluded," adding that "the generals engaged in heated debates without trying to read one another's mind."

Generals are a symbol of authority and the flowers of professional soldiery. The proverb that "there are no weak soldiers under a great commander" explains in a nutshell how important generals are in the military.

Gossip mongers say that when an officer is promoted to the rank of general, he will receive as many as 95 privileges. He will not only get his own flag but also a star plate, an official car, and an aide-de-camp.

To say that the military changes is to say that generals' way of thinking changes, and this change will have ripple effects on the rank and file.

Regarding the changes that are taking place among generals, a general at the Army Headquarters said: "Basically, generals these days are political entities but are not political players. This is not to say that generals interfere in politics but to say that for commanding officers who have the authority to make important decisions and bear the responsibility for the outcome of these decisions, it is a necessary element of their virtues to have a full political insight and sense."

Another general in the Defense Ministry said: "People may not want to believe, but the military is where the liquidation of the aftermath of the Fifth Republic has been carried out better than in any other place. There is not, nor can there be, such a thing as a political officer." By way of illustration, he cited the reshuffle of the military hierarchy last spring. He stressed that "political generals were all eliminated, and that those who were appointed to key posts are not politically oriented people and they were chosen by the holder of the prerogative of supreme command [the president] for their excellent qualifications." Generally, the modifiers used to distinguish the profiles of generals are brave, intelligent, and virtuous.

A general said, "The past was the era of brave generals; recently it was the days of intelligent generals; and now is the era of virtuous generals." He explained that "the trend among generals who want to be known as virtuous generals proves that a rational way of thinking is permeating their minds to this extent." Settling among generals these days is the unprecedented trend for seniors to foot the bills at dinner parties and other gatherings. Until last year the Blue House had hosted annual year-end promotion parties for generals, with the director general of the presidential security force present. The latter's presence raised a delicate protocol problem. But, beginning this year, these promotion parties will be hosted by the defense minister, a fact illustrating the fading political colors of the military.

Reports that the number of those generals commonly known as "sponsors" providing material support are indicative of the shrinking political influence of generals. Generals' way of thinking is said to be becoming more flexible, but their conservative, authoritarian propensity carried down from their predecessors is still deeply entrenched.

Generals on the whole recognize that they can no longer be a political power, but do not seem to have forgotten politics. When Kim Yong-kap, minister of government administration, suddenly resigned last March, some analyst pointed out that his resignation marked an eruption of the dissatisfaction among the 17th Military Academy graduating class, which is at the center of the military, with the lukewarm way of dealing with the leftist forces. In fact, many generals hold the strong conviction that the "leftist forces" can never be tolerated.

In addition, the stir created by the address of Gen Min Pyong-ton (15th graduating class of the Military Academy), superintendent of the Military Academy, to the Military Academy commencement ceremony on 21 March represented the reaction of the military to the government's North policy. It must have been in the same vein that the military hierarchy, shocked by the Rev Mun Ik-hwan's visit to Pyongyang, demanded strong countermeasures. They are also angry that the military is being looked down upon.

Generals are very much upset by the remarks made by opposition assemblymen during a recent National Assembly inspection into government operations to the effect that "there have been many instances of exceptional appointments of soldiers who know nothing but assault and annihilation to diplomatic posts." A general expressed his displeasure in these words: "The road to becoming a general is one of ceaseless learning and cutthroat competition. A man without talent cannot be a general."

Of the total 430 general officers in the three branches, Military Academy graduates number 361 (84 percent as of October last year). The society of generals is enmeshed with strong ties of academic, regional, and senior-junior connections.

In the case of Military Academy graduates, about 10 to 15 percent of each class have won a star or stars, whereas the comparable percentage for graduates of the cadet training course is only 1 or 2 percent.

Hanahoe, which is known to have had a leading role in military intervention in politics in the past, has reportedly been dissolved. But it is undeniable that the gathering of each Military Academy graduating class still has a significant influence within the military.

The gathering of each graduating class from time to time expresses its views to the senior classes, not on the basis of superior-inferior relations in rank but on the basis of senior-junior relations in terms of graduation classes, but none of these expressions are regarded as an act of disobedience.

When none of the 2Xth [unspecified, either 20th or any subsequent graduating class] of the Military Academy were promoted to the rank of general officer in the screening process for generals last year, the complaint of the class was conveyed to the leadership.

As is well known, there is a striking regional disparity in the society of generals. As of October of last year, in the case of army major generals, of the total 99, North Kyongsang Province accounted for 22, South Kyongsang Province 10, South Cholla Province 8, North Cholla Province 5. Of the 16 chiefs of staffs in the three services appointed since 1980, North Kyongsang Province accounted for 10, and South Kyongsang Province 4. Of

the 7 DSC commanders, the Yongnam area accounted for 4, and the Honam area for only 1.

Among high schools, Kyongbuk High School graduates account for a large number of corps and division commanders, in addition to Chief of Staff Yi Chong-ku.

Deputy Chief of Staff Sin Mal-op and Education Commander Kim Chin-yong are graduates of Pusan High School, and Kyongnam, Seoul, and Taechon High School graduates account for many generals with three stars or more.

On the other hand, another tie which binds the military as strongly as regional connections is the superior-inferior relationship cemented while serving in the same unit.

Gen Kim Chin-yong is the only man who is still in active service among what is known as the Kyongbok Palace group during the "12 December [1979] incident," but the chief of staff and regimental commanders of the 9th Division led by Maj Gen No Tae-u in those days hold such key posts as commander of the Capital Defense Command, corps commanders, and the superintendent of the Military Academy, with the rank of three-star general.

Trailing Military Academy graduates, ROTC graduates are currently emerging as an influential force in the military. Some of the graduates of its first four graduating classes have been promoted to general officers, and they now account for over 20 major and brigadier generals.

In connection with the plan for a unified command of the three services which is currently being pushed, attention is being focused within and without the military on a reshuffle of general officers scheduled for late this year. There should be no strife or factionalism within the community of generals. But if strife or factionalism does exist, it should be resolved ahead of all other troubles. This is because generals should be an elite group in control of the military.

[21 Oct 89 p 3]

[Text] Views of Pending Political Issues

Assemblyman Chong Ho-yong, who is under strong pressure from the three opposition parties to resign as member of the National Assembly, said in his farewell speech when he stepped down as defense minister on 19 February last year: "Now that one of my Military Academy classmates has become president, the only way to help him manage political affairs to the limits of his conviction is for me to relinquish my cabinet post."

With that belief Chong turned in his resignation despite the pressure from some of his men to retract his decision to resign. But at present, contrary to his wishes, he has become the greatest liability for the No Tae-u administration in connection with the Kwangju issue.

On that day he stressed the so-called "doctrine of civilian-military politics." By this he did not mean that the military should interfere in politics, but he wanted to stress that a kind of chivalry or martial spirit is needed in politics.

There is no way of knowing whether he spoke of the martial spirit on that day, conscious of his determination "not to pull back in a cowardly manner" [over the Kwangju issue]. Currently, however, he is insisting that the demand for his resignation is untenable and making moves which indicate that he will resist the pressure for his resignation "resolutely and honorably."

Concerning the Kwangju issue, which is at the heart of the whole issue of liquidating the aftermath of the Fifth Republic, Chong said in his farewell address that "in those days, the military did nothing but obey the orders, and if anyone criticizes the military for having done a wrong thing, I will risk my life to rebuke it." Apparently, there has been no change in his attitude, and his words seem to represent the current thinking of the military.

He was the first to become Army chief of staff among graduates of the regular Military Academy and the last to shed the uniform among members of the 11th Military Academy graduating class. He still has personal connections with those in power in the military, with many followers among generals.

For him to leave public office, taking the responsibility for the Kwangju issue, will mean the crumbling of the "legitimacy of the military," and the military will refuse to yield to the last, in connection with the Kwangju issue.

In a recent TAEGU MAEIL SINMUN interview, Assemblyman Chong said, "If I, who acted in accordance with the official orders of the Army Headquarters, were to be forced to surrender my public office, nobody knows how the military would react." This statement has something in common with the thinking of soldiers that when doubts are cast upon the legitimacy of the command chain, which is vital to the military, the military will lose its footing.

The military is very reluctant to openly comment on the question of whether Assemblyman Chong should resign or not. The activities of the military in Kwangju may have been justified as far as the chain of command was concerned. But one cannot but be aware of the political and moral sides of the Kwangju issue.

An Army general said: "The essence of the Kwangju issue has changed politically. Only the immoral side of the military has been brought into relief, without regard to the situation in Kwangju and the behavior of the [rebel] civic force in those days." He went on to say that "in my personal opinion, if Assemblyman Chong is forced to retire over the Kwangju issue, it would mean making a political scapegoat out of the military, and other generals share this same view."

Last year the military repeatedly showed a very sensitive reaction and displeasure toward the hearings at the special committee on the Kwangju issue and the Kwangju documentaries presented by the two TV stations.

A typical example is the libel suit filed by Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun against Assemblyman Chong Ung (PPD [Party for Peace and Democracy]) on 21 December.

In addition, on 14 January Defense Minister Yi sent a letter to the Kwangju special committee saying that "if unilateral testimonies distorting the truth should continue at the hearings, the military will have to unveil the truth even by going so far as to take some countermeasures." He said that his letter represents the views of high-ranking officers of the whole Armed Forces. This letter drew criticism that it amounted to a military inference in political affairs.

In addition, when features on Kwangju, such as the MBC's "The Song of the Mother" and the KBS' "Kwangju Speaks," were shown on TV, the military immediately issued a statement protesting against the demeaning of the troops under the Martial Law Command who exercised legitimate powers, by describing them as if they were a gang of murderers massacring innocent citizens.

The presentation of a phony photograph by Assemblyman Yi Hae-chan (PPD) during the 7 December Kwangju hearing aroused strong indignation in the military. There was an avalanche of telephone calls to the Defense Ministry and the Army Headquarters from angry officers and men. Sgt Yun Myong-hwan, who was in the picture and who was the victim of the misrepresentation, contributed an article titled "Disgrace and Anger" for public edification. Basically, the military regards this as stemming from an ulterior motive to defile the honor of the military and alienate the military from the public.

What makes the military angry more than anything else is an attempt to defile its reputation.

From the point of view that "silence would amount to an admission of all errors," the military is countering with rebuttals and suits, though it is fully aware that these rebuttals and suits are not easy to back up. A general in the Defense Ministry said: "The military is also an interest group. It is not a genuinely democratic society."

As examples of the visible efforts on the part of the military to redress the wrongs of the Fifth Republic, the removal of political soldiers, the partial apology for the Samchong education (through a statement by former Minister O Chae-pok urging victims to notify the Defense Ministry), the rehabilitation of Chong Song-hwa and other "disgraced soldiers," and the apology for the "27 October suppression."

Regarding the issue of having former President Chon Tu-hwan's testify before the National Assembly and the question of how to treat him, the military is showing a very delicate position. This may be partly because these issues are directly related to the incumbent president, but the main reason is that among the military leaders there are still many who were the beneficiary of the former president.

Answering question by reporters late last year, Army Chief of Staff Gen Yi Chong-ku said that "there should be no punishment of the buried man." This is a general view shared in the military. Generals in active service are refraining from visiting the Paektam Temple, except some high-ranking generals who pay courtesy calls after dinner. They feel that a smooth and speedy settlement of the question of how to treat Mr Chon will lighten the burden of the military.

The military feels great apprehensions about the leftist forces in our country and their tendencies. Considering the fact that the basic duty of the military is to preserve the establishment, this may be the natural atmosphere of the military. To the hypothetical question "If the system of liberal democracy itself is in danger of collapse and the public wants the military to intervene, what will the military do?" Army Chief of Staff Gen Yi replied, "In that event, the military should intervene, but it would return to its original duty as soon as it finishes the job."

What the military regards as the internal enemy who is no less dangerous than the threat of North Korea are the leftist forces, and when in the judgement of the military, the water level of the forces seeking the communization of the South exceeds the danger mark, then the military is bound to become restless.

The military takes acute labor disputes in the same vein.

Under the North policy of the Sixth Republic, the military has limited the category of outside enemy to the North Korean Workers Party, the North Korean Army, and their satellite forces and insists that there is no change whatsoever in its concept of military antagonism. This is because the military equates the left-leaning forces bent upon bringing down the establishment to be the same as an outside enemy.

[22 Oct 89 p 3]

[Text] **Plan 818**

The military structural reorganization plan aimed at creating a unified command is stirring up a lot of controversy. This plan, aimed at drastically changing the external form and command system of the military for the first time in 41 years since the establishment of the ROK Armed Forces, is so revolutionary in substance that it may be called a "second birth of the army."

The attention of the public and the political world is focused on why the three services needed to be unified and why the plan which has been withheld is being

promoted at this of all times. This is because many people not only look at this plan from a purely military strategic point of view but also tend to interpret it in political terms, conscious of the influence and place of the military in our society.

This plan, known by its code name of "Plan 818," has been treated as a Class-1 military secret.

Some say that the plan was given the figures 818 to commemorate the ax- murder case committed by North Korea in the joint security area of Panmunjom on the 18th of the 8th month of 1976, and some others say it is just a random code name.

It was during the National Assembly inspection of government administration last year that Plan 818 came to light, and it became a subject of active discussion by opposition assemblymen during this year's National Assembly inspection of government administration. However, the Defense Ministry has not yet fully disclosed the details of this plan. But when the controversy arose, it only gave a limited briefing to the presidents of the three opposition parties. However, it must be pointed out first that in view of the important significance of this plan, and because the Army belongs to the people, the government should make the content of the plan public so that it can go through the necessary process of hearing public opinion and the opinions of civilian experts on military affairs and avoid difficulty in the process of legislation.

The main point of Plan 818 is to create a defense general staff by integrating the emergency functions of the three armed services and bring the three services under the operational control of the Chief of the Defense General Staff, a post that will be newly created. The posts of the chiefs of the three services will be maintained but they will only be in charge of administrative functions such as personnel affairs and logistics. In this way, military administration and operational command will be separated from each other.

As reasons behind the integration plan for the three services, the Defense Ministry gives the strategic merits and the efficiency in the management of the military that will result from the integration. It is noted that in the context of modern warfare requiring speedy action, it will be difficult under the current three service system to insure a quick combat response. It is further explained that an all-out mobilization of all weaponry available for the Army, Navy, and Air Force will be needed for the prosecution of war, and especially in a theater like the Korean Peninsula with a narrow coast-to-coast breadth, the operational condition requires a speedy command function to counter an enemy attack.

It is further noted that it is necessary to "get rid of the flab from the military" because with the emergency functions separated among the different services, there has been a lot of waste in budget and manpower, and because the Defense Ministry and the headquarters of the three services have become too flabby compared with their counterparts in other countries, making the administration of the military uneconomical. The plan is also interpreted as a strategic move to cope with the transfer of operational command from the United States and a possible reduction of U.S. Forces in Korea.

To these explanations, opposition politicians and critics first point out that too much power will be concentrated on the Chief of the Defense General Staff, leaving room for weakening the foundation of civilian control, and that ultimately, the chief of the Defense General Staff will have the right of personnel management, weakening the functions of the defense minister. Moreover, they stress that because in reality the chief of the Defense General Staff is likely to be chosen from the Army, it is feared that this will be a relative slow down of the development of the Navy and Air Force, both of which require a high degree of specialization, and cause imbalance and strife among the three services.

Another view which is attracting attention is the suspicion that the structural reorganization of the military may be pushed in advance of or in conjunction with the scheme for political reorganization.

According to this view, the motive behind the promotion of the military structural reorganization plan which coincides with the midterm of the No Tae-u administration is a political calculation to maintain the legitimacy of the Sixth Republic and preserve the influence of the military as the backbone of the Sixth Republic, in preparation for a revision of the Constitution to introduce the parliamentary cabinet form of government or for taking the reins of government in the next term. People holding this view pay attention to the fact that the term of Army Chief of Staff Yi Chong-ku expires 1 June next year and notes that the sweeping reshuffle of the Army hierarchy at the end of last March was carried out in an effort on the part of the person having the prerogative of supreme command to establish a full-fledged system of control of the military.

An Army general scorned this kind of analysis and criticized it as follows: "In a nutshell, the military structural reorganization is a task to trim the fat and make it more lean. Contrary to the claim of the opposition parties, the integration will result in a gradual reduction in the number of general officers. Moreover, supposing a military coup would recur, the ringleader wouldn't possibly be a high-ranking general."

The military is very much displeased at the attitude of trying to interpret the military structural reorganization plan from a political point of view. Basically, how the military, which is normally averse to reform, views Plan 818 is not clear. The plan is said to be initiated by the military hierarchy, particularly, the Army. But military observers point out that there is much opposition to the plan because of the conflicting interests of the different services.

Sources conversant with the situation in the military said that the move to restructure the military organization

should be understood as being pushed at the presidential level, and not by any particular group in the military.

This view has something in common with the analytic opinion that a structural reorganization of the military will be more difficult under the next administration, which is expected to be under a civilian leader, than it is now.

Saying that "military restructuring motivated by a political necessity is bound to be in the nature of an adventure," he declared that "this plan should be interpreted purely as a major surgical operation on the military structure to cope with the security environment."

On the other hand, considering the fact that as in any other organization, power in the military also comes from the right of personnel administration rather than from the right of operational command, the claim that the authority of the chief of the Defense General Staff will be overextended may not square with reality. If as reported now, the administrative power, including the right of personnel management, is exercised by the defense minister through the chiefs of staff of the three services, checks and balances will be attained.

Since the ROK Armed Forces transferred their operational power to the commander in chief of the United Nations Command during the Korean war, they have maintained the command structure copied from the U.S. Forces, and it is an undeniable fact that our Armed Forces have a unique military structure distinct from those in other countries. Only a small number of countries, including Japan and Argentina, maintain the system of three services existing side by side with one another. In the United States, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has the right of operational command, and in most of the European countries, the chairmen of the joint chiefs of staff are in charge of operations and some administrative aspects. Turkey, Canada, Israel, Taiwan, and communist countries including North Korea, have the system of the commander of a unified command, the thoroughgoing structure of an integrated army. The security and social environment of each country determines the structure of its armed forces.

Even in the military, prospects for the passage of the plan to integrate the three services are murky. The government claim that the restructuring plan will be pushed forward from a purely security-oriented strategic point of view can be accepted only through an open public discussion of the plan. Open discussion will be taken as a sign showing changes in the military.

[26 Oct 89 p 5]

[Text] **Improvement of Military-Civilian Ties**

In 1988 following the inauguration of the Sixth Republic, a total of 3,410 petitions were filed with the defense minister. This is a drastic increase compared with 2,902 cases in 1987 and 2,841 cases in 1986.

Aside from its simple statistical implications, this increase is a concrete signal indicating the relationship between the military and society in general is changing. However, currently, it is interpreted as an indication of increasing demands of society on the military rather than as signifying that the military has opened its hitherto closed doors a bit.

In our society, the civilian-military relationship has been in a tense state ever since May 1961. Throughout the nearly 25 years of military rule, military culture has struck its roots everywhere in society, and despite that most adult men have military experience, society as a whole remains indifferent, and has a hands-off attitude toward the military, with a persecution complex underlying this attitude.

This sense of alienation on the part of the public has occasionally manifested itself in the form of an excessive misunderstanding or an overblown denunciation of the military, with practically no efforts toward understanding.

A general in the Defense Ministry said: "Improvement of the civilian-military ties rather than national defense is the greatest task confronting the new leadership of the Sixth Republic because modern warfare is not fought by the military alone but requires an all-out mobilization of the national resources of the country." Noting that "the civilian-military ties have been distorted," he asserted that the responsibility for this distortion should be shared equally by the military and society.

Recently, efforts to improve civilian-military relations are visible within and without the military. One striking aspect is academic researches designed to improve these relations. In the past, due to excessive limitations generating from the rigidity of the military, not only the study of military affairs by civilian scholars but also research efforts on the part of the military to formulate proper civilian-military relations were practically nonexistent. In view of this, it deserves to be noted that the Defense Research Institute under the Defense Ministry held a "seminar on civilian-military relationships" in April and invited civilian and military scholars.

In addition, approaches to the military by civilian scholars have recently been stepped up, and military organizations have been expressing their concern about the relationship between the military and society in their own scholastic journals or by holding discussion meetings.

The key subjects of the seminar on civilian-military ties were the achievements and failures of the military and the question of whether or not a military coup will recur. A Koryo University professor divided the causes of a coup d'etat into three elements. They are: inducing factors (social confusion, an economic panic, the incompetence and corruption of politicians); trust factors (factional strife, discontentment with personnel administration within the military, and the propensity of the military elite to power); and behind-the-scenes factors

(connivance and support by the United States). After analyzing all these factors, he concluded that there is a slim chance of a military coup. But another professor, pointing out the perennial political proclivity of the military that has continued since the founding of the Army, refuted by saying that he is skeptical about the political neutrality of the military under the present circumstances in which the conditions for achieving the independence of the military from political influence, for the democratization of society, and for national reunification are not mature. He said that the question of a coup should be viewed as a matter of volition rather than a matter of circumstance. Concerning the merits and demerits of the military to the Korean society, a military scholar expressed a view favorable to the military on the whole. But he came under strong attack from civilian scholars. The way the seminar proceeded would have been unthinkable in the past.

The stance of the military in trying to collect critical views from society through a civilian-military joint academic seminar like this is clearly indicative of changes taking place in the military. However, observers of this seminar sensed that something was amiss when they saw that the prevailing attitude among ex-officers and active-duty military scholars was that of giving priority to defending the military and hoping that society would understand the military, instead of being critical of the military.

The efforts of the military to improve its ties with the public are insufficient in qualitative terms also, although they have produced many quantitative results. There have been many visible results, such as the drastic reduction of defense security zones, the easing of the off-limit areas for civilians, the transfer of military units to local areas from urban centers, the improvement in military affairs administration, and the assistance to flood-ravaged areas. Particularly, the devoted labor service rendered by the military in the flood-stricken areas helped improve the negative image of the military to the extent that the people in these areas gave farewell parties to the departing soldiers to express their thanks from the bottoms of their hearts.

After the rehabilitation of the flood damage, the Army chief of staff jokingly called himself the flood-damage prevention commander ("subang saryonggwan"), [homonymous in Korean with the title the commander of the Capital Defense Command]. He was alluding to his post as the commander of the Capital Defense Command which he held when Seoul was struck by flood in 1984. The situation in Japan is different than in our country, but according to a public opinion poll conducted by the Self-Defence Forces, 80 percent of the Japanese mentioned disaster relief as the first duty of the Self-Defense Forces. This indicates that the military's assistance to civilians is an important factor in the civilian-military relationship.

Yet, the authoritarian attitude has not disappeared in the administration of affairs involving civilians, and there have been some cases of civilian property rights infringed upon for national security reasons. But this attitude and practice should be rectified.

Another important factor which should not be overlooked in civilian-military relations is the military's stance toward the press. In reality, the public depends wholly on the press for news and information on the military.

Currently, a move is afoot to revise the Military Secrets Protection Law, but it is difficult to deny that the military takes a negative view of the press on the whole. The military feels that the press is impairing public confidence in it by carrying irresponsible and abusive reports on the military without filtering them. The complex that the military has of being persecuted by the press graphically manifested itself in the case of terrorism committed against O Hong-kun, the city desk chief of CHUNGANG KYONGJE, which may be regarded as the first case of civilian-military conflict since the inauguration of the Sixth Republic. Late last year an active duty Air Force officer published a paper titled "A Study on the Attitudes of Reporters and Military Officers Toward Military-Related Reportage," in which he drew the conclusion that there exist a great conflict in view between these groups. Of the total 57 themes, the greatest disagreement between the two groups was found on these themes: "The case of Reporter O represents a suppression of the press by the military," "it is up to the military to determine whether a military secret is to be made public or not," and "military secrets are outside the sphere of news coverage and reporting."

This paper said that to resolve the conflict, the military should understand the critical function of the press, whereas the press should exercise prudent judgment in view of the reality of national security.

There is still a long way to go to establish proper civilian-military relations. It goes without saying that to narrow this distance, the military and society should open their doors to each other by taking various measures, such as hiring civilians on defense posts, carrying out mutual exchanges in the educational and research fields, improving the military's administration of civilian affairs, and hiring military veterans for civilian jobs. But as a practical matter, it may be said that the efforts on the part of the military to understand and accept the complex and divergent social norms and values and ultimately adapt itself to society are more urgently needed than the efforts of society to understand the military.

[27 Oct 89 p 5]

[Text] Relations With U.S. Forces Upgraded to Give-And-Take

"The hardware of the ROK Armed Forces is the U.S. Forces and its software is the Japanese Army," said a Defense Ministry officer regarding the roots of the ROK

Armed Forces. By this he meant that when the ROK Army was inaugurated in 1948, it copied or modeled itself on the U.S. Army in structure, military doctrines, and weapons system; but those who operated it were mainly people who served in the Japanese Army. The U.S. Military Advisory Group, organized with 500 or so U.S. officers and men in 1949, was an essential ingredient in the process of creating the ROK Army. This advisory group not only gave military and economic assistance and transferred weapons but also transplanted the U.S. military traditions in, and handed it down to, the ROK Army in various fields by providing weapons, teaching how to operate weapons and organize units, and providing troop training.

The U.S. Forces directly commanded the ROK Armed Forces in the Korean war, and since then the ROK Armed Forces have been under the operational control of the U.S. Forces. The 43,000-strong U.S. Forces in Korea exist still as the nucleus of the war deterrent.

In this way the ROK and U.S. Forces are bound by an inseparable bond. Despite the anti-American sentiment in Korea, the friendly ties between these two forces are the most secure aspect of the ROK-U.S. relationship that has been relatively unaffected so far, compared with the political and economic aspects.

However, the ROK-U.S. military relationship has undergone a lot of change, and presages further changes.

The ROK Armed Forces which have grown into a 650,000-strong elite force is assuming the full face of an independent entity, accelerating the process of weaning itself from U.S. tutelage.

The development of tactics suitable to the Korean terrain, together with the development of defense industry symbolized by domestic manufacture of tanks and weapons deserves attention. Particularly, the military restructuring work which has recently become an object of controversy is being watched with attention as signifying a major surgical operation on the U.S. style military structure which has been maintained for the past 30 years. This is because the restructuring work has an aspect of ultimately smoothing the transfer of the right of operational command.

The growth of the ROK Armed Force is bringing about a change in the attitude of the U.S. military, which had been very much high-handed in its relations with the ROK Forces until the 1970's. The days were gone when the commander in chief of the U.S. Forces in Korea had free access to the Blue House and "lorded over" the defense minister. According to the current protocol, the commander in chief of the U.S. Forces in Korea sits below the defense minister and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but he sits above the chiefs of staff of the three services because he is concurrently the commander of the Combined Forces Command (CFC), whose rank is above the chiefs of staff of the three services.

Until recently, it was very difficult for the defense minister to change his schedule for a meeting with the commander of the U.S. Forces, but now the commander cancels his other appointments to meet the defense minister when the minister wants to see him.

The inauguration of the CFC in 1978 marked a revolutionary event in the military relationship between the two countries. Prior to that, everything was centered around the United States, but now the two sides make joint decisions. This is so because the CFC is directed by the strategic guidelines of the ROK-U.S. Military Committee (MCM) represented by the chairmen of the joint chiefs of staff of the two countries. Until 1970, the annual ROK-U.S. security consultative meetings (SCM's), meetings between the defense ministers of the two countries, had been held at military bases, not in the Pentagon, with the U.S. deputy defense secretary attending as the senior delegate. In this way the Korean side was treated "inhospitably." Explaining the change in the attitude of the U.S. Forces, one of the officers who attended this year's SCM said, "U.S. working-level officers proposed meetings with us by going so far as to volunteer to pay for the expenses out of their pockets, not from the budget, in order to cooperate with us in work."

Of the six deputy chiefs of staff of the CFC, four are ROK generals in charge of personnel affairs, information, logistics, and planning. This also illustrates the upgrading of the status of the ROK Armed Forces.

These changes are an outcome of the growth of the ROK Armed Forces, but they are also attributed to the change in the interpretation of the presence of the U.S. Forces in Korea on the part of the ROK and U.S. Forces. A general dealing with affairs relating to the U.S. Forces said, "in the past the words 'an army living on charity' were fit to describe our army, but certainly a give-and-take relationship has now been established." In other words, the old concept that the U.S. Forces are stationed here solely for the security of the ROK is now being changed into the concept that they exist for the interest of their own country. This changed view is very important for the ROK to place itself in an advantageous position at the negotiating table with the Untied States.

In the past the U.S. commander sometimes exercised influence on ROK military personnel appointments with a view to placing pro-U.S. or U.S.-educated people in key posts. A U.S. officer said, "now the U.S. commander does not have enough influence to have any one of his Korean staff officers promoted." Explaining how the U.S. Forces respect the will of the ROK Armed Forces, Gen Chong Chin-tae who was transferred in April from his post as deputy commander of the CFC, said that "General Menetrey told me that he had instructed his American staff officers to go through me when they submit a report to him."

The position of the ROK Forces in their relations with the U.S. Forces has been definitely upgraded. The U.S.

Forces in Korea is attentively watching the ROK Armed Forces, constantly analyzing and reporting on its moves, and are nervous about the development and sale of weapons by the ROK Forces.

To the question, "what the U.S. Forces should do if there is a military coup," a concerned military official said, "there is nothing they can do; their political influence on the ROK Forces has long been lost.

The area in which the U.S. Forces have the greatest influence in the military field is information. The functions for which the ROK Forces are still wholly dependent on the U.S. Forces are three C's (command, control, and communication). SR-71, AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System], and the U.S. tactical air control center (TACC) in Osan—their activities to collect and analyze information on the areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula are playing the role of the eyes and ears of the ROK Forces. The U.S. Forces in Korea furnish information by these means to the ROK Forces reportedly on a selective basis.

Reportedly, the U.S. Forces at first raised opposition to relocating the Yongsan base. But they are well aware that their position is such that they have no alternative but to accept the political realities in Korea, and according to a concerned official, the working-level officials from the two sides are smoothly cooperating with each other on this issue.

The relationship between the ROK and U.S. Forces is moving toward a level which will be mutually beneficial.